Exerpt - See link below for complete article
In the prison or jail setting, inmates'' claims run the gamut of everything
from complaints about food that is cold to claims about lack of proper medical
attention to claims about inadequate access to the law library. With respect to
claims about the conditions of confinement, including those for overcrowding and
cold food, and claims about allegedly improper medical attention, the standard
that is utilized is "deliberate indifference."
This is true whether the claim is asserted under the Eighth Amendment (which
applies to claims by convicted prisoners) or the Fourteenth Amendment (which
applies to claims by pretrial detainees). Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,
1490 (11th Cir. 1996). Please note the distinction between the claims of
pretrial and convicted inmates so that you do not erroneously proceed under the
incorrect and inapplicable Amendment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97
S.Ct. 1401 (1977).
In addition to making certain that suit is brought pursuant to the correct
constitutional provision, it is critical that a plaintiff allege and establish
that the actions of the individuals and/or entity were deliberately indifferent,
as opposed to merely negligent. Both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit
have made clear that even "gross negligence" is insufficient to support either
an Eighth Amendment or a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1974); Cottrell v. Caldwell, supra, at 1490 ("In any event,
the Supreme Court''s recent decision in Farmer v. Brennan, ___ U.S. ___, 114
S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), which was released after this case left the
district court, makes it clear that ''gross negligence'' is not part of the
standard for judging custody mistreatment cases under the Due Process Clause.").
Instead, the standard to be applied in both jail and prison conditions cases
is the standard of "deliberate indifference." Farmer v. Brennan, supra; Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991); Cottrell v. Caldwell, supra. A
very good discussion by the Eleventh Circuit of what conduct is and is not
deliberately indifferent can be found in Hill v. DeKalb Youth Detention Center,
40 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 1994). In Farmer, the Supreme Court undertook to define
and explain the term "deliberate indifference."
In that case, a transsexual inmate with feminine characteristics who was
incarcerated with other males claimed to have been beaten and raped by another
inmate. In his lawsuit, the inmate alleged that Wisconsin prison officials had
acted with deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth
Amendment because they knew that the penitentiary had a violent environment and
a history of inmate assaults and that he would be particularly vulnerable to
sexual attack. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
prison officials, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
On review of the case by the Supreme Court, the Court was called upon to
define the term "deliberate indifference." In so doing, the Court made reference
to the subjective component of the inquiry:
We hold . . . that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference. . . . [A]n official''s failure to alleviate a significant risk that
he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot
under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.
Farmer, 114 S.Ct. at 1979 (emphasis supplied). Thus, in the case of
inmate-on-inmate violence, as in other jail-related claims, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that jail officials knew of a substantial risk of serious harm.
"Deliberate indifference" requires that a deliberate choice be made to do or not
to do something. Failing to take action when the risk is not perceived is not
deliberate and is not unconstitutional.
An illustrative situation of mere negligence was presented in Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986). There, an inmate (Daniels) who
slipped on a pillow left on the jail stairs by a deputy sheriff (Williams)
brought suit under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming
that Williams'' actions deprived him of his "liberty" interest in freedom from
bodily injury without due process of law. Finding that Williams'' acts were, at
most, negligent, the Eastern District of Virginia granted Williams'' motion for
summary judgment, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted Daniels'' petition for writ of certiorari to
address "the inconsistent approaches taken by the lower courts in determining
when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional
tort" and "the apparent lack of adequate guidance by [the Supreme Court]."
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329, 106 S.Ct. at 664. In affirming the lower courts''
decisions in favor of Williams, the Court made clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not "a font of tort law:"
. . . Historically, the guarantee of due process has been applied to
deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life,
liberty or property. . . . No decision of this Court before Parratt supported
the view that negligent conduct by a state official, even though causing injury,
constitutes a deprivation under the Due Process Clause. This history reflects
the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its
forebear in the Magna Carta . . . was "intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." . . . By requiring the
government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property," the Due Process Clause promotes
fairness in such decisions. And by barring certain government actions regardless
of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, . . ., it serves to
prevent governmental power from being used "for the purposes of oppression." . .
.
We think that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the
prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate''s property, are quite remote from the
concerns just discussed. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests
no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To
hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due
process of law.
. . . Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the
governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying
down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living
together in society. We have previously rejected reasoning that "would make of
the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States" . . . .
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-32, 106 S.Ct. at 665 (citations omitted).
The deliberate indifference standard also is applied in cases involving jail
or prison suicides. The plaintiff, a representative of the deceased inmate''s
estate, must show that the jail official displayed "deliberate indifference" to
the prisoner''s taking of his own life. Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission,
10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994); Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561,
1563 (11th Cir. 1990); Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir.
1989).
A finding of deliberate indifference requires that officials have notice of
the suicidal tendency of the individual whose rights are at issue in order to be
held liable for the suicide of that individual. Popham, 908 F.2d at 1564
("absent knowledge of a detainee''s suicidal tendencies, the cases have
consistently held that failure to prevent suicide has never been held to
constitute deliberate indifference"). See also Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.
3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1209 (1996); Schmelz v. Monroe
County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[defendants] cannot be liable
under § 1983 for the suicide of a prisoner ''who never had threatened or
attempted suicide and who had never been considered a suicide risk''").
Furthermore, the deliberate indifference standard requires a strong likelihood
rather than a mere possibility that self-infliction of harm will occur. Popham,
908 F.2d at 1563.
© 1999 Freeman, Mathis & Gary, LLP
These materials have been prepared for educational and information purposes
only. They are not legal advice or legal opinions on any specific matters.
